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CONSTITUTIONAL PARTNERSHIP AND THE
STATES
Aaron Jay Saiger*
INTRODUCTION
Lawrence Sager's and Larry Kramer's new volumes both endeavor,
to borrow Sager's term, to redefine the American constitutional
"partnership," those structures through which courts and others
influence the shape and content of constitutional commitments. Each
evokes an ideal constitutional partnership importantly different from
the one we live today. Sager argues that constitutional judges should
seek justice as "partners" of the founding generations; Kramer
contends that legislators, executive officials, and lay citizens should
reassert interpretive parity with constitutional courts in the task of
constitutional interpretation.' This brief Essay seeks to illuminate
these evocative arguments in light of another feature of the American
constitutional partnership: its federal nature. What are the
implications of Sager's and Kramer's thinking for our federalism?
And what does thinking about federalism tell us about Sager's and
Kramer's arguments?
I approach Sager's and Kramer's accounts in this way not because
they are somehow incomplete; neither author, after all, asserts any
intention of writing about federalism. Nor are the states absent from
either volume; indeed states are prominent in both. Particular state
actions and policies naturally appear as the repeated objects of federal
constitutionalism, because so many of the most difficult constitutional
problems of the past and present are cast in terms of how the
Constitution constrains state action. The states also play a role as
constitutionally important institutions. Sager explicitly notes that
''our constitutional text and jurisprudence respond in part to concerns
of political justice by architecting and protecting structural features of
government-the horizontal separation of powers and the vertical
distribution of authority within a federal structure."' Kramer, to take
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I owe thanks to
Martin Flaherty, Abner Greene, Thomas Lee, and especially to Larry Sager and
Larry Kramer for helpful conversations.
1. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review 247-48 (2004); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory
of American Constitutional Practice 5 (2004).
2. Sager, supra note 1, at 154-55.
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but one set of examples, discerns some of the roots of our national
acquiescence to judicial supremacy in an earlier willingness to permit
supreme federal judicial review of state legislative action 3 and in later
efforts to block exactly this sort of review.4 And in both volumes, the
states frequently appear as comparative cases. Because the histories,
values, and political cultures of the various states overlap with those
of the Union, state constitutional commitments shed important light
upon their federal analogues.5
Nevertheless, at key points in the authors' arguments there is more
to say about the states. Sager, for example, argues that federal courts
properly "underenforce" many of the value-bearing provisions of the
Constitution, in part because federal judges leave the job of enforcing
constitutional rights to their fullest extent to the Congress and to the
executive.6 Should not this list include the states? What duties do the
states bear regarding underenforced rights? What duties do state
court judges have?
These queries lead in turn to another question. The Federal
Constitution governs a polity simultaneously governed by state
constitutions, with their own rights-bearing provisions. Does Sager's
argument suggest that American states' constitutional practices should
themselves be understood as justice-seeking partnerships between
state founders and state judges?
And this inquiry, which casts states as the subject rather than the
object of constitutional theory, raises a parallel question for Kramer:
Should nonjudicial actors in the states assert a role in state
constitutional interpretation similar to the one Kramer advocates on
the national stage? Here I offer a very brief sketch of contemporary
developments in the states to complement Kramer's historical
comparison of state and nation; for in the states today, we see
noticeably more movement than at the federal level towards the sort
of polyarchic constitutionalism Kramer advocates. The real world
expressions of such constitutionalisms suggest, I think, some lessons
regarding the national practice Kramer prefers.
I make no claim that the failure to exhaust the topic of federalism is
a flaw in either Sager's or Kramer's worthy volumes. Rather, the
balance of this short Essay seeks simply to raise some aspects of the
3. Kramer, supra note 1, at 75.
4. Id. at 152-53.
5. Kramer, for example, analyzes debates in the states during the founding
period regarding the proper role of their own judiciaries to illuminate parallel
controversies at the federal level. Id. passim. Sager similarly analogizes state high
courts and the Supreme Court of the United States in noting that judicial norms
constrain high court judges even absent routine enforcement of such norms. Sager,
supra note 1, at 88-89. To take one more example, Sager identifies the policy of
inoculating constitutions against easy amendment as present and potentially
problematic in both federal and state constitutions. Id. at 161-62.
6. Sager, supra note 1, at 93-94.
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federalism question that I think both challenge and extend the
positions and arguments that Sager and Kramer put so provocatively
before us.
I. JUSTICE SEEKING IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
Sager identifies the gravest challenge to his justice-seeking account
as the gap between political justice and justice as dispensed by
constitutional judges: the courts offer substantially less justice than
reasonable conceptions of political justice demand. Sager's towering
example, his gnawing problem, is "the Constitution's pointed
indifference to poverty."7 To Sager, a guarantee that "persons who
are willing to make reasonable efforts on their own behalf enjoy the
ability to secure the minimum necessities of a decent life"8 is a self-
evident, necessary component of political justice; equally self-evident,
the constitutional courts of the United States guarantee no such
rights.9  Sager responds with his underenforcement thesis: The
Constitution does, as a justice-seeking document must, include a right
to minimal material welfare; but this constitutional right is not
enforced by constitutional judges.'
Such abstention, Sager says, is reasonable as a matter of
comparative institutionalism; that is to say, rights whose realization
require complex strategic and bureaucratic decisions and permit a
range of politically contested approaches are bad candidates for
judicial enforcement even when constitutionally guaranteed.ll
Abstention is also a matter of principle: Underenforcement gives
additional weight to nonjudicial institutions' obligations to seek justice
under the Constitution. If the constitutional judge abstains when to
guarantee a constitutional right requires strategic implementation and
permits political choice, then a constitutional Congress, on its own,
has real and unduckable obligations to make choices and select
strategies that ensure that right's just realization.
Sager's exposition of underenforcement focuses on the relationship
between the federal courts and the Congress, but it is just as germane
if applied to the states. Sager's underenforcement thesis implies that
the states bear important-and too often unfulfilled-obligations
under the Federal Constitution. Sager recognizes this implication,
although he does not dwell upon it. Thus he defines the
underenforcement thesis as a "general premise of divided
constitutional labor" under which the "judiciary is constrained...
from fully enforcing the Constitution" and "other governmental
7. Id. at 85.
8. Id. at 79, 149.
9. Id. at 79.
10. Id. at 84-128.
11. Id. at 87-88, 140-42.
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actors" therefore must give life to unenforced rights. 12 And Sager
includes states among such "other governmental actors"; for example,
he explains the rational basis test at the heart of the Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence as a policy of "self-conscious deference
to state legislatures and to Congress."13
Sager, though, says that the underenforcement thesis "is especially
important with regard to Congress's authority to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments."' 4 Indeed, on Sager's understanding of
the Federal Constitution, but for underenforcement, the Congress and
the states would have complementary roles. To the Congress would
fall the duty to enforce all Reconstruction-amendment-based rights,
leaving "the states somewhat free to develop their own normative
visions in the substantial space not covered by the Constitution." 5
The Congress would enforce the core principle of distributive justice;
the states would be permitted to tinker at the margins, where
reasonable people differ. States might choose, for example, to enforce
a "more robust right of material well-being"'6 than that defined by the
minimal standards of adequacy guaranteed by the Congress.17
But it is not the case that just because the scope of state policy
choices exceeds that of the Congress, there is a "federal division of
normative labor" 8-if Sager means by "division" a discrete partition.
Whatever normative vision a state might embrace on its own, it will
share with the Congress the duty to give life to the rights-bearing
provisions of the Federal Constitution. As Sager argues, a city council
that restricts pornographic speech and a federal court that considers
the constitutionality of its action have both undertaken to determine
what is required and what is permitted by the guarantees in the
United States Constitution of free speech and equal protection. 9
Similarly, Sager states that the federal "constitutional right to an
adequate education" that he postulates relies for its implementation
"in the first instance ... on local, state, and federal legislators.
2°
Recognizing that states have the same duty as the Congress to give
life to the justice-seeking requirements of the Federal Constitution is
fully consistent with Sager's justification of judicial underenforcement.
12. Id. at 102; see also id. at 158 ("[P]rimary responsibility for the maintenance of
constitutional guarantees like the right to minimum welfare must lie with our popular
political institutions.").
13. Id. at 116.
14. Id. at 102.
15. Id. at 115.
16. Id. at 152.
17. Sager's comment that extensive welfare rights might interfere with the
Constitution's pluralist and democratic commitments, however, suggests that he might
find that a truly robust state welfare guarantee raises federal constitutional problems
of its own. See id. at 152-53.
18. Id. at 115.
19. Id. at 73.
20. Id. at 96; see also infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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To the extent that underenforcement is desirable because it requires
the Congress as well as the courts to take independent responsibility
as a guardian of constitutional rights, so too the states. And to the
extent underenforcement is motivated by the Congress's comparative
institutional advantage over the judiciary in making effective strategic
decisions and trade-offs in the service of welfare rights, states share
those advantages and then some. For one, unlike the Federal
Constitution, state constitutions are not silent with respect to rights to
minimum welfare. Sager repeatedly claims, for example, that the
unarticulated constitutional guarantee of minimum material welfare
necessarily subsumes a right to primary and secondary education;"
but such a right is explicit in all fifty state constitutions.2 Several state
constitutions also guarantee rights to material well-being beyond
education.23 The explicit commands of state constitutions position
states better than the Congress successfully to enforce the unwritten
parallel terms of the Federal Constitution.
Perhaps even more important than the particular commitments of
state constitutional texts are the innumerable commitments associated
with the states' police powers. These place states in a position to
ensure a right to minimum material welfare dramatically more
effectively than the Congress can. The extraordinary generality of the
police power, essentially a general grant of authority to further the
general welfare, stands in sharp contrast to the federal government's
limited scope. Moreover the police power is lived day-to-day, as
policy on the ground. The states, unlike the Congress, are neck-deep
in the quotidian work of policing streets, educating children, feeding
the hungry, sheltering the homeless, and protecting the public health.24
Why not emphasize the duty of those who discharge these functions
routinely to exercise their associated discretion consistent with the
Federal Constitution, regardless of the enforcement policies of the
federal courts?
21. See Sager, supra note 1, at 96, 126.
22. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform
Litigation, 28 Harv. J. on Legis. 307, 311 n.5 (1991).
23. See Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of
Positive Rights, 20 Rutgers L.J. 881, 893-96 (1989) (collecting state constitutional
provisions mandating public, material assistance to the indigent ill, the poor, and the
elderly).
24. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space
Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959, 975 (1985)
("It is important to remember that we are still a federation and that most of the legal
events that touch the lives of people from day to day still emanate from state and
local governments."); accord Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 220 (2000) ("[M]ost
governing in America -including almost everything that really matters to people in
their daily lives-is still done by state officials.").
20051 1443
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
As I have suggested, it seems unlikely that Sager would object to
doing so.25 He clearly agrees that enforcing the Constitution is a duty
shared by all government officials, state, local, and federal. Therefore,
Sager's argument that there are underenforced federal constitutional
rights like that to minimum welfare, compelled not by constitutional
text but by elementary political justice, requires significant change in
the ways that state officials discharge their police powers. These
changes, I think, are somewhat more extensive than Justice in
Plainclothes recognizes. A vast swath of state and local actions in
policy areas much more diverse than those addressed by the Congress
must be developed and implemented in light of federal constitutional
obligations themselves defined by the demands of political justice.
The scope of this assertion is belied in part by Sager's focus on
congressional powers and duties.
Two things, I think, account for Sager's emphasis. The first is
Sager's explicit effort to argue against the line of Supreme Court
doctrine that rejects congressional authority to enforce the
Reconstruction Era amendments under interpretations thereof more
capacious than those the Court itself endorses. Sager argues
convincingly that if the underenforcement thesis is true, then this line
of cases cannot be justified.26 More broadly, though, I think that
Sager's rhetorical and analytic focus upon the Congress rather than
the states flows from the rather dismal record of the states as agents of
political justice. It is the Congress, not the states, that legislated
against private discrimination in the real estate market,27 offered a
private right of action to the victims of gender-motivated violence,28
sought to protect religious practices from regulation,29 and restricted
the ability of employers to penalize women burdened by family
responsibilities. 30 In the states, by contrast, we see efforts to exclude
undocumented children from public schools,31 to burden access to
welfare payments for the desperately poor,32  and to deny
accommodation to disabled state employees-this last refusal one that
25. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. Such objection would be
inconsistent with Sager's view that state courts may, notwithstanding federal courts'
unwillingness to do so, enforce constitutional norms to their fullest extent. See
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1248 (1978); see also infra note 50 and
accompanying text.
26. Sager, supra note, 1, at 116-17.
27. Id. at 105 (citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)).
28. Id. at 109 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
29. Id. at 117 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
30. Id. at 124 (citing Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)).
31. Id. at 95 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
32. Id. at 98 (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970)).
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the Congress sought to reverse through federal legislation.33 State
courts have been similarly viewed as only "grudging" guarantors of
federal rights.34
None of this is unreasonable in light of Southern segregationists'
devotion to "states' rights" in the previous generation. Their
rearguard action against civil rights tarred federalism so thoroughly
that it can be difficult for us today to think of states as agents of,
rather than obstacles to, realizing political equality and fairness, much
less minimal material well-being for the poor. That states might
become agents of a right to economic welfare is further belied by the
observation widely accepted in contemporary political science that
wealth redistribution-necessary to any serious attempt to mitigate
poverty-is, as both a positive and normative matter, best left to the
largest national government rather than to states and localities where
citizen and business exit is straightforward (indeed constitutionally
protected), where interjurisdictional competition looms large, and
where business interests have particular political strength.35
But Sager's is a normative argument. Demurring to the states'
dismal record and acknowledging the political difficulties they face, if
there are federal constitutional rights of the sort Sager claims there
are, then states must enforce them, even if-especially if-
constitutional courts underenforce them. And states sometimes do
play precisely the role Sager assigns to the Congress in his analysis.
The recent University of Michigan affirmative action cases provide a
straightforward example. In Gratz v. Bollinger36 and Grutter v.
Bollinger,37 the justice-seeking right at issue is not the right to minimal
material welfare but what Sager calls "the repair of the harms of
historic injustice" to nonwhite citizens.38 Sager argues, just as he does
for minimum welfare, that such repair is "require[d]" under the
Federal Constitution but unenforced by the constitutional courts.39
Michigan's affirmative action policies are efforts to repair such
"structural harms'"4" in a fashion consistent with state officials' own,
arguably justice-seeking understanding of what the Fourteenth
Amendment demands. Just as in the cases Sager discusses, the United
States Supreme Court struggled to fit its limited conceptual toolkit of
"compelling interest" and "narro[w] tailor[ing]" to this phenomenon,4
with only partial success. It seems far more reasonable to say that in
33. Id. at 117 (citing Bd. of Transp. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001)).
34. See Sager, supra note 25, at 1243.
35. See generally, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, City Limits (1981).
36. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
37. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
38. Sager, supra note 1, at 79.
39. Id. at 79-80.
40. Id. at 107.
41. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322.
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such cases, a state, taking steps that the Court would decline to
require, acts constitutionally when it legislates pursuant to its own
constitutional duty to guarantee equal protection of the laws.42
Just as Sager argues vis-A-vis the Congress, underenforcement by
the Court places upon state and local officials, especially those
involved in exercising the police powers in ways that affect their
citizens' material well-being, an obligation to re-understand their
roles. They remain bureaucrats, they remain strategists, they remain
agents of political and policy choice, but they also must labor under
constitutional constraints dictated by the guarantee of minimal
political justice.43 This conclusion has quite complicated implications,
and I want to end this part of the discussion by just gesturing in the
direction of two issues whose importance and complexity suggest the
need for further theorizing and analysis.
The first is the question, familiar especially from international and
comparative human rights law, of what it means to guarantee
substantive rights like a right to minimal material well-being. Sager
recognizes this problem, of course, but underestimates somewhat the
extent to which his argument makes its resolution so pressing. Sager
defends underenforcement itself by noting that in enforcing
substantive rights, "decisions of strategy and responsibility remain on
the table even after we have accepted the basic norm of a right to
minimum welfare."44  But the problem is more vexing than Sager
admits. To explain why he finds in the Constitution only a right to
minimal material welfare rather than a mandate for a fully just regime
of distributive justice, Sager notes not only disagreements among
reasonable people as to what full distributive justice requires but also
an "enormous range of hard choices":
Whose legitimate complaints do we address first: The worst off, or
the larger group (we imagine) who are quite badly but not worst off?
... Fundamental structural features of our economy-for example,
whether it is market-driven or centrally managed- .. . will have
42. Cf Sager, supra note 1, at 95. Sager argues that in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982):
The Court was not prepared to treat the minor children of illegal immigrants
as a suspect class, nor to treat education as a fundamental right .... But
[various Justices] focused on essentially the same thing: the great
importance of education for the life prospects of the young, impoverished
victims of Texas's exclusionary policy.
Sager, supra note 1, at 95.
43. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1132, 1156 (1999) ("Bound by an oath
of office, state legislators must act in a situation of constrained discretion. Food and
shelter are no longer merely aspirational goals of political justice; they are instead a
part of the constitutional fabric and a nondiscretionary feature of the legal order.").
44. Sager, supra note 1, at 87. This sentence appears in Sager's discussion of the
right to adequate medical care, which he believes, like education, to be a "critical
component[]" of the constitutional welfare right. Id.
1446 [Vol. 73
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immediate and long-term consequences for distributive justice; these
fundamental features and directions also have enormous
consequences on many other fronts. To what degree does
distributive justice govern or prevail against other strong reasons we
have for making these fundamental choices?
45
But these are not questions that arise only when one considers the full
implementation of distributive justice; we face the same questions of
"strategy and adequacy" when we try to guarantee merely minimal
justice. Take Sager's own examples of components of the basic
welfare right, schooling and health care.46 The first quoted question,
how to balance the needs of the very worst off and those only slightly
better situated, has been a central dilemma of some efforts to
guarantee all children minimally adequate education.47 The second,
the interaction of justice-based rights with decisions about
fundamental economic arrangements, is one of the most basic of the
many conundrums that stymie efforts to provide all persons with
minimally adequate health care.48
45. Id. at 140.
46. Id. at 87, 96.
47. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) ("Abbott II"). The Abbott
II court pronounced itself "unable to conclude that most districts are failing to deliver
the educational opportunity required by our State Constitution." Id. at 393. Its
finding of constitutional violation was confined to approximately thirty of the state's
very poorest districts, and the state was ordered to make per-pupil funding available
to them comparable to that available the state's thirty-odd richest districts. See id. at
408-09. This leapfrogs the poorest over the next-poorest, in whose plight the court
has signaled relatively little interest. As the court stated, "[wie realize there will
undoubtedly be concern on the part of those districts that share similar characteristics
but do not fit within our definition and that therefore will not receive the aid provided
for." Id. at 409. It continued, "[w]e suggest that in most cases such districts will also
prove to have advantages over those we are targeting .... [G]iven the limitation of
judicial power, we recognize that the kind of equity that can be done in this area by
the Legislature cannot be accomplished by judicial order." Id.
48. In 2000, it was estimated that guaranteeing universal coverage might cost
more than $300 billion in additional public funds. See Steven A. Schroeder, Health
Policy 2001, 349 New England J. Med. 847, 848 (2001). Such expenditure would have
raised the ratio of health care expenditure to gross domestic product from about
13.5% to 16.5%, and would have represented an increase in public sector health
expenditure of about 50% and in total national health expenditure of almost one-
quarter. See Cynthia Smith et al., Health Spending Growth Slows in 2003, 24 Health
Aff. 185, 186 & tbl. 1, 188 & tbl. 3 (2005) (reporting annual figures for GDP, national
health expenditures, and health expenditure of public sector funds). Cf. Jonathan
Oberlander, Are Americans Closer Than We Think to National Health Insurance?, 21
Health Aff. 103, 104 (2002). Oberlander lists obstacles to the adoption of single-payer
insurance in the United States beyond increased public expenditures, including
overcoming.., the political power of health insurers and medical providers
vested in maintaining a profitable status quo; the numerous hurdles that
fragmented U.S. political institutions throw in the way of any comprehensive
reform; the reticence of the public to create a public monopoly in health
insurance; [and] cultural ambivalence about the scope of government power.
Id.; see also Sherman Folland et al., The Economics of Health and Health Care 409
(4th ed. 2004) (choices regarding health care "funding mechanism[s] could have large
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Constitutional courts avoid these difficulties through
underenforcement. The Congress avoids them in some part and on
some occasions because of the limited scope of congressional
authority. But state and local elected and appointed officials, whose
daily bread involves providing services that directly interact with
citizens' welfare, cannot avoid them at all. If Sager has correctly
found in the Constitution rights to political justice, then he has made
urgent the very difficult task of being much more specific about what
such officials have a duty to do. When must they act? When do they
retain discretion? And when are they constrained? Answering these
questions is all the more pressing because the job will not be taken up
by the underenforcing constitutional courts. The rest of us must
undertake to help state and local officials do it themselves.
Another fascinating and thorny issue that the application of Sager's
theory to the states raises is how to define the proper role of the state
courts in enforcing federal constitutional norms, and how then to
define the proper understanding by federal courts of what state courts
have done in enforcing federal rights. When he introduces his
argument that there is light between the full scope of constitutional
rights and their judicial enforcement, Sager asks his reader to
"[c]onsider the case of the judges of the highest court of a state when
they rule on a matter of state law, or of the justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States when they address matters within the
federal sphere."49 Here, I want to think about the case that Sager
omits: a state court confronting a claim of federal constitutional right.
In his pathmarking Fair Measure article, Sager argues that state courts
may "voluntarily" enforce federal constitutional rights to their fullest
extent, federal underenforcement notwithstanding (and that the
United States Supreme Court should let such decisions rest
undisturbed unless "competing constitutional concerns are at
stake").5 °  Justice in Plainclothes resurrects these questions as
normative ones: Should state courts follow the lead of the federal
courts and underenforce federal constitutional rights? Should they
underenforce them to the same extent?
It is tempting to answer affirmatively. The task of constitutional
interpretation that faces state judges in this position is the same as
that before federal judges. Both have a duty to act as a "robust
constitutional judiciary"51 and both confront the difficulties of doing
so effectively. 2 The Constitution before them describes the rights it
impacts on the resources allocated to health and on the possible redistributions as
from rich to poor and young to old").
49. Sager, supra note 1, at 88.
50. Sager, supra note 25, at 1248-49; see also id. at 1259 ("If a state court is moved
to give broader scope to a particular constitutional value .. " (emphasis added)).
51. Sager, supra note 1, at 72.
52. Cf. Hon. Margaret H. Marshall, "Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from
Their Children": Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence,
1448 [Vol. 73
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guarantees in abstract and general terms53-often so abstractly that
particular rights must be inferred in the face of textual silence.
Effective enforcement of such rights admits a range of political
choices and requires political savvy. Sager's resolution of these
perplexities, through the underenforcement principle and the cabining
of the breadth of constitutional justice relative to political justice,54
seems to apply to state and federal judges equally. This is consistent
with Sager's typical descriptions of justice seeking and
underenforcement in federally neutral terms, as, for example, where
he contrasts "judicially articulated constitutional law" with the duties
of "nonjudicial political actors"55 to justify "the judiciary's secondary
role."56
One might, however, challenge the premise that state courts are in
fact properly thought of as part of our "robust constitutional
judiciary." Though perhaps jarring, for the purposes of Sager's
constitutional partnership it may be more accurate to characterize
state judges as "nonjudicial political actors." A variety of reasons
offer themselves, the most important of which is that state court
judges are generally elected (in a few states appointed) to limited
terms, while Article III judges serve for life. State court judges do not
share the structural protections that make federal judges, for Sager,
such attractive interpretive partners:
Judges are considerably more detached from the pressure of public
opinion than are regularly elected public officials. Many judges are
appointed for life, and most enjoy reasonably substantial job
security; federal judges, with the guarantee of service for life at an
undiminished salary are the model in this regard .... [T]he
comparative independence of judges frees them from the potentially
distorting influence of public will. 57
A similar analysis leads Professor Helen Hershkoff to note that "[t]he
fact of judicial election ... alter[s] the political vulnerability of state
judges, subjecting them to a kind of popular veto that in theory sets a
boundary or tether on judicial decisionmaking,"58  and
complementarily, that a "state court's decision, which binds only the
people of that state, enjoys a greater perception of democratic
79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1633, 1641 (2004) (Chief Justice of Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts stating that, "[a]s state court judges, we know that we owe our
allegiance to both the state and the federal constitutions").
53. Sager, supra note 1, at 76.
54. Id. at 143.
55. Id. at 94.
56. Id. at 102.
57. Id. at 74.
58. Hershkoff, supra note 43, at 1158. The United States Supreme Court recently
decided that in important ways, state high court judges are more like politicians than
like United States Supreme Court Justices. See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S.
765, 781-82, 784 (2002).
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legitimacy and local responsiveness than that of an unelected Article
III [judge]."59
The politicized and popularized context of state judges' work-
judges who are of course still bound by the duty to faithfully interpret
the Constitution-suggests that the (dutiful) state court judge, lacking
salary protection or a life term to insulate her from the political
jungle, must enforce constitutional rights up to their "outermost
margins. '60 The best analogue to the state judge in Sager's normative
vision of the constitutional partnership thus remains one he first
suggested in the more descriptive context of Fair Measure: not the
federal judge but the conscientious member of Congress. Neither may
underenforce; both are obliged to seek justice, despite being-indeed
precisely because of being-immersed in politics nonetheless.
This understanding of the obligations of the state judge is, I think,
theoretically compelling. Nevertheless, it assigns to state judges a
difficult, indeed a perilous, role. Their duty is to give life to the full
extent of federal constitutional rights, constrained simultaneously by
most of the institutional limitations of judging that make
underenforcement so attractive to federal courts and by the pressures
of popular politics from which federal judges are largely inoculated.
Nor do the complexities end there. Recasting Sager's analogy of
the state court judge to the member of Congress from one about the
permissible scope of their power (either might choose to enforce a
constitutional norm more broadly than the underenforcing federal
courts) to one about their normative duties (both must enforce
constitutional norms to their outer limit) raises an additional
complication. In the context of the descriptive analogy, the state
court's role as an interpreter of state constitutions might be thought to
offer an alternative route to full enforcement of the Federal
Constitution, one that would not involve opening a federal courts can
of worms. "State courts.., have state constitutional provisions upon
which to draw. If a state court is moved to give broader scope to a
particular constitutional value, why not simply do so through the
exclusive or concurrent medium of the state constitution... ?""
Sager responds in Fair Measure by noting that parallel provisions are
59. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the
Judicial Function, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1834, 1902 (2001). Hershkoff makes this latter
point in the context of state court adjudication of state constitutions, but I think it
applies as well to state court interpretation of the Federal Constitution. See also
Christine M. Durham, Speech, The Judicial Branch in State Government. Parables of
Law, Politics, and Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1601, 1606 (2001). Fair Measure itself
nods in the same direction, noting that "some state courts may well perceive
themselves as occupying constitutional roles vis-A-vis state and local legislative and
administrative bodies within their jurisdictions quite different than that accepted by
the federal courts." See Sager, supra note 25, at 1256.
60. See Sager, supra note 1, at 94.
61. See Sager, supra note 25, at 1259.
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not always available in state constitutions, 62 and that "state courts may
find it desirable to speak in a federal constitutional tongue. ' 63 The
normative analogy, by contrast, raises the possibility that state courts
might be obligated to seek justice in their interpretation of their own
constitutions as well as in their interpretation of the federal one.
When the Texas Court of Appeals decided Lawrence v. Texas, for
example, its duty might have extended beyond the need to decide
whether the Federal Constitution permits a state to "demean
[homosexuals'] existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime"' in light of "principles of liberty and
equality rooted in [national constitutional] jurisprudence, spawned in
the course of decades of its justice-seeking enterprise."65 The Texas
court might also have been obliged to void such legislation in light of
what it acknowledged to be the state's own, "more extensive" and
more "specific[ally] protecti[ve]" constitutional guarantee of equal
rights for all.66 The role of the state courts in a justice-seeking federal
constitutional partnership, then, interacts with how justice is to be
sought in states' own constitutional partnerships. I turn to that
question next.
II. JUSTICE SEEKING IN THE STATES
Are state court judges, when interpreting state constitutions,
properly thought of as participating in a "transtemporal partnership"
between themselves and "those persons in the founding or amending
generations who participate in the utterance of the Constitution's
text," with the object of bringing the state's "political community
better into conformity with fundamental requirements of political
justice"?67
Sager offers some good reasons to think not. As noted above, state
judges differ from federal judges in ways that Sager thinks relevant.68
Limited terms and periodic elections deprive state judges of the
distance from politics that permits their Article III cousins to engage
in the kind of justice-seeking interpretation Sager favors.
"Deliberation," says Sager in a somewhat different context, when
"compromised by a thick overlay of political caution is in danger of
losing much of its value as deliberation. 69
62. See id.
63. Id. at 1260.
64. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
65. Sager, supra note 1, at 223-24.
66. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 352 (Tex. 2001), overruled by Lawrence, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
67. Sager, supra note 1, at 76.
68. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
69. Sager, supra note 1, at 212.
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Then there are the differences between state and federal
constitutions. Sager makes much of the parsimonious phrasing of the
rights-bearing sections of the Federal Constitution, and even more of
the obduracy of that constitution to amendment. 7' That the
supermajority requirements of Article V are so difficult to meet
generates "constitutional choices of the right kind, . . . that is, the
choice of widely acceptable, general, and abstract precepts."
71
Generality and abstraction in turn "creat[e] space for deliberation by
constitutional courts.172  Sager contrasts these characteristics of
national constitutionalism with those of the states:
Consider a governmental regime in which there is a constitution, but
it is relatively easy to amend. The constitution in this regime, not
surprisingly, is relatively prolix and detailed, reflecting both the
availability of amendment and actual frequent resort to amendment
by plebiscite and/or legislation. We do not have to conjure such a
regime from whole cloth: Many state constitutions bear at least
some resemblance to this stylized regime. California's constitution,
for example, has been amended over five hundred times and runs to
some four thousand pages. In such a regime, the line between
constitutional provisions and ordinarily legislation remains, but is
blurred; and in such a regime, electoral participation in the shaping
of constitutional content is greatly increased. But in such a regime
the range of judicial judgment over questions of constitutional
substance is substantially foreshortened, and so too is deliberative
participation. There is nothing abstract about the trade-off between
electoral and deliberative participation here.73
Notwithstanding these differences, I see in Sager a strong argument
for insisting upon justice-seeking interpretation on the part of state
court judges, in partnership with that state's founding generations.
Early in his analysis, Sager offers an "emphatic" denial that his
account is universal. He does not claim that American constitutional
"practice is ... ideal for any other of the world's peoples," only that it
"represents a reasonably good choice for a people such as ourselves-
a plural people for whom justice matters. '74 But this particularist
disclaimer is directed at peoples situated quite differently from us
Americans, perhaps because they have an entirely different religious
and cultural heritage, or because they are emerging from colonial
domination. State polities are composed of people "such as
70. On the relative ease of constitutional amendment in the states, see Robert K.
Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions As an Independent
Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1833, 1852-54 (2004).
71. Sager, supra note 1, at 77.
72. Id. at 218.
73. Id. at 218-19; cf Hershkoff, supra note 43, at 1163 ("Perhaps the most acute
divergence between Article V and many state constitutional amendment procedures
is the citizen initiative, which allows a minority of a state's voters to place a proposed
constitutional change on the ballot for consideration by the electorate as a whole.").
74. Sager, supra note 1, at 10.
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ourselves" as no other polities could be; they are ourselves. The
people of each of the American states are "a plural people for whom
justice matters,"75 and even if they might be somewhat less "plural"
than the people of the Union, justice matters to them no less. This is
an argument long ago suggested, though not explicitly endorsed, by
Sager himself: "[M]ost state constitutional provisions address
essentially the same issues of political morality as do their federal
constitutional counterparts.
7 6
If we embrace each of the states as a justice-seeking constitutional
partnership of its own, notwithstanding their phonebook-size
constitutions with their metastasizing amendments, and further
notwithstanding the incentives for their elected judges continually to
test the political winds, we come to an overall vision of American
justice seeking somewhat different from the one Sager's own volume
seems to envision. Consider Sager's account of Plyler v. Doe,77 which
held unconstitutional Texas's policy of excluding children not legally
present in the United States from its public schools." Sager
understands Plyler as a case about a federal constitutional right-his
posited right to a minimally adequate education-that the Court
ordinarily declines to enforce.79 The Court was able to abandon its
policy of underenforcing educational rights in Plyler because, by
choosing to operate free public schools, the Texas "legislature had
already resolved the questions of social strategy and responsibility
from which the Court has shied, and what remains for adjudication is
the claim of constitutional right shorn of its massive entailments of
social strategy and responsibility."8
This will be precisely the state of affairs in a great deal of state court
litigation about rights to minimal material well-being. Had Plyler
originated in the Texas state courts rather than the federal district
court, the state judges would not have needed to reach the federal
question. Instead, the Texas courts would likely have viewed the state
constitution itself as having sufficiently resolved the questions of
"social strategy and responsibility" by declaring that "it shall be the
75. Id.
76. Sager, supra note 24, at 961. This statement appears with several others that
together constitute an argument that state judges should "feel obliged to defer to the
constitutional judgments of the [United States] Supreme Court in the name of a
common tradition of political morality." Id. at 973. Sager characterizes this argument
in its entirety as "plausible but erroneous." Id. at 961. But Sager says nothing about
the truth of its constituent claims. I agree that state court deference to federal rights
jurisprudence is not advisable. I argue that Justice in Plainclothes implies that there is
a political/constitutional morality common to the states and the nation, but this shared
character in no way implies that state courts should defer to federal ones in
determining its contours.
77. 457 U.S. 202 (1982),
78. See Sager, supra note 1, at 95-97.
79. Id. at 96.
80. Id. at 97.
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duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable
provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of
public free schools."81 I say "would" rather than "could" because this
position was in fact taken in the first Edgewood Independent School
District v. Kirby case ("Edgewood I"), in which, seven years after
Plyler, the Texas Supreme Court held that the constitutional terms
"suitable" and "efficient" define standards that limit the discretion of
the legislature to establish an unequal system of educational finance."
This is precisely the sort of judicial move that Sager lauds the United
States Supreme Court for making in Plyler: Although a reviewing
court might properly decline to use naked judicial power to demand
that the legislature create a school system, once the decision had been
made to establish it, the court can readily demand that the system be
fair.83 And it is a judicial move made in a similar jurisprudential
context: State constitutions may lack the parsimony of the Federal
Constitution, but the particular constitutional provision upon which
the Edgewood I court relies is only slightly more specific than the
federal Equal Protection Clause and clearly leaves plenty of "space
for deliberation by constitutional courts."'  The most striking
difference may be that state court judges, by virtue of their relatively
closer involvement in politics noted above, may be somewhat more
willing than a federal court would be to decide that sufficient strategic
and political decisions have been taken by others to permit judicial
rights-enforcement in the service of justice. Where Plyler on Sager's
account derives its willingness to enforce an otherwise underenforced
81. Tex. Const. art. 7, § 1.
82. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989)
("Edgewood I").
83. Had the Texas Constitution omitted the requirements of suitability and
efficiency, the Edgewood I court implies that it might have held the bare remaining
legislative duty to "provide ... [the] public free schools" to be "committed
unconditionally to the legislature's discretion" with no possibility of judicial review.
Id.
84. Sager, supra note 1, at 218. So too California. That state's supreme court held
that there is a judicially enforceable constitutional duty upon the legislature to
establish an equitable system of school finance. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929,
949 (Cal. 1976) ("Serrano I"). Serrano II relied upon the California Constitution's
equal rights guarantee: "No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted
which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any
citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same
terms, shall not be granted to all citizens." Cal. Const. art. 1, § 21 (in effect at the time
of Serrano II, but since recodified and amended slightly as Cal. Const. art. 1, § 7(b)).
Whatever the prolixity of the California Constitution as a whole, the rights-bearing
provision the Serrano II court deemed relevant is no less general and abstract than its
federal counterpart. See also Sager, supra note 24, at 961 (discussing similarities in
"language, history, or structural attributes" of state and federal constitutional
provisions). This is not to say, of course, that specificity and prolixity are not present
in the rights-bearing sections of the California Constitution. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art.
1, § 7(a) (restricting, in considerable detail, the application of state equal protection
guarantees to the areas of public school student assignment and transportation).
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right from legislative action, Edgewood I does so based merely upon
the particular articulation of a duty in the state constitution.
State courts, of course, have not unanimously adopted the
Edgewood I approach; many have abstained precisely because they
see school finance as an area commended to the political and strategic
discretion of their elected branches." An argument could be made
that these courts are also behaving consistently with Sager's vision.
They do not deny a legislative duty to educate children, but they find
that duty not susceptible to the judicial power. 86 In other words, they
underenforce. But I think Sager's account, especially in light of his
understanding of Plyler, is more consistent with those states that do
assert judicial power over school finance; underenforcement is hard to
justify in light of the explicit state constitutional guarantees that states
operate adequate public schools. Moreover, on Sager's account, the
federal courts do not get justice seeking correct every time either; his
argument, rather, is that justice seeking plus underenforcement offers
an attractive normative understanding of constitutional practice with
enough positive echoes in federal constitutional case law to seem
plausible. The same is true for state constitutional justice.
All this implies, I think, that the primary address for the vindication
of the unarticulated positive rights so central to Sager's understanding
of political justice should be not the national legislature, but the
justice-seeking judiciaries of the states. To be sure, Sager's
framework remains important at the federal level. It governs the
actions of a responsible Congress and leaves room for federal courts
to enforce positive rights in a wide range of circumstances (when, for
example, cases involve acts of Congress, or when states have failed in
their own justice-seeking obligations). But Sager's book, which seeks
a place for political justice at the center of the particular enterprise of
federal constitutional law, has convinced me rather of the centrality of
justice seeking to American constitutionalism generally; it is an
argument for a constitutional partnership where justice-seeking states
are central. The states, because they exercise police powers, would
typically be the appropriate (or at least the first appropriate) port of
call for those who seek policies that will guarantee their rights to
material well-being.87 If, in those states, these claimants find not only
an administrative and political apparatus geared towards providing
the police power services necessary to realize such rights,88 but also
find a justice-seeking constitutional judiciary centered upon state
constitutions sometimes more explicit about justice than the federal
85. See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); City of
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).
86. See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1192-93, 1196; Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 57-58.
87. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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one,8 9 and find further that that judiciary is led by state judges
structurally less divorced than federal judges from politics and
therefore less prone to underenforcement, 90 then states are the natural
place to realize the kind of political justice Sager demands of the
American constitutional system.
Although this state-centered view may not be what Sager has in
mind, I think it is consistent with his views. Consider this account,
relatively late in Justice in Plainclothes, of the right to minimum
economic well-being:
These immediate times aside, we have at least aspired to secure the
right to minimum welfare. There has been a pervasive social and
political recognition of the need for a safety net, and efforts to
implement a base of public support that satisfies the limited promise
of that metaphor. Public or publicly supported education has not
flourished in our time, but neither, emphatically, has it perished; we
would, I strongly hope and believe, never retreat from our sustained
commitment to a free basic education. Even in the face of our
inability to rationalize the distribution of medical care, most if not
all urban centers provide a network of public hospitals or some
other mechanism by which the most urgent medical needs of the
poor are met.91
Who is the "we" that "aspires" to minimum welfare? It is all of us
Americans-but it is we, not primarily in our capacity as Americans,
but as Texans or Californians or New Yorkers. It is the states, much
more than the federal government, that have prevented (considerably
prodded by their own constitutional courts) the withering of public
education in our time. The states are nearly equal partners of the
federal government in meeting the most urgent medical needs of the
poor.92 The communities in which we conduct our daily lives are the
polities that provide the basic services and protections that Sager
places at the core of America's political and constitutional
commitments. Sager's theory demands that in those constituent
polities of the Union, as much if not more than in the Union itself,
constitutional partnerships should seek justice.
III. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE STATES
Whether state constitutional partnerships should be justice seeking,
in Sager's sense, brings me finally to the question of whether they
should also be "popular," in Kramer's sense. Have the state courts,
89. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
90. See supra text accompanying note 60.
91. Sager, supra note 1, at 159.
92. In 2003, states spent $109.9 billion under the Medicaid program and the
federal government spent $158.7 billion. See Smith et al., supra note 48, at 188 tbl. 3.
Medicaid is "the largest source of funding for medical and health-related services for
America's poorest people." Folland, supra note 48, at 462.
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like the United States Supreme Court of Kramer's account, "made
[their] grab for power" in matters of state constitutional law? Will
"we the people" of the states "let them get away with it?" And, if not,
"[h]ow are we supposed to stop them"? 93
A full resolution of the first of these questions-have state high
courts made their "grab for power"?-would require an analysis of
similar or even greater complexity than Kramer's federal one. The
People Themselves does not provide it; although Kramer begins his
analysis with a rich account of state practices of judicial supremacy,
his interest in states is instrumental, confined to the light that the
states shed upon evolving federal political and legal institutions. As,
over time, central authority becomes more dominant and its legal
culture more independent, the states lose their relevance for Kramer.
Thus Kramer retells the fascinating history of state legislative
resistance to state supreme court authority in Ohio and Kentucky in
the early 1800s, which included the legislative abolition of the
Kentucky Supreme Court and a two-year period in which "two high
courts sat in Kentucky" like competing medieval papacies;94 but
Kramer offers no agenda for those who might want to unseat the
state, as opposed to the federal, judicial aristocracies of today. The
last mention Kramer makes of state court judicial review is of a
"general quiescence on constitutional matters" in the "antebellum
era," notwithstanding a "slight upsurge in state court constitutional
activity in the 1840s and 1850s, facilitated by the fact that the state
judiciaries had become electorally accountable."95
In hazarding an answer of my own, I think it safe to say that
nowadays, the direction of influence characteristic of the colonial and
early national periods has reversed: Citizens' and lawyers' norms and
expectations around state judicial review are heavily influenced by
their expectations about federal judicial review, which are shaped by
general, state-independent trends in the national political and
intellectual culture.96 Therefore, in the minds of many, state courts
are the authoritative interpreters of state constitutions exactly as the
federal courts have final say over the national Constitution.
Consider, for example, the school finance cases alluded to in the
previous section.97 State judges prepared to take upon themselves the
job of determining whether a legislative school finance scheme is
constitutional inevitably meet arguments (sometimes from their
colleagues) that engineering the state budget is the exclusive province
93. Kramer, supra note 1, at 249.
94. Id. at 151-52 (citing, inter alia, Theodore W. Ruger, "A Question Which
Convulses a Nation": The Early Republic's Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review
Power, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 826 (2004)).
95. Id. at 209.
96. See id. at 232.
97. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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of the legislature and executive. They often respond by saying
emphatically that it is their judicial duty to say what the law is.98
Another even more telling example is the recent judicial reaction to
the refusal of the Mayor of San Francisco to honor the requirement of
a California statute that marriage licenses be granted only to opposite-
sex couples.9 9 The California Supreme Court responded with a
vigorous assertion of judicial primacy:
Laws are presumed to be, and must be treated and acted upon by
subordinate executive functionaries as constitutional and legal, until
their unconstitutionality or illegality has been judicially established,
for, in all well regulated government, obedience to its laws by
executive officers is absolutely essential, and of paramount
importance. Were it not so the most inextricable confusion would
inevitably result .... 100
This is a fine example at the state level of what Kramer describes as
"the tendency to minimize moments of popular constitutionalism, to
portray opposition to the Court as something rare, exceptional,
dangerous, and revolutionary: an act of civil disobedience to properly
constituted authority."'' 1
Although I think the California court's understanding of judicial
primacy is the dominant view in the states, a counternarrative is
substantially more audible in state constitutional culture than in its
federal counterpart. This stems in part from the structural differences
between state and federal constitutions already noted. 2 "Because
state constitutional amendments are relatively ordinary events in a
state's political life," Professor Hershkoff writes, "state court judges
can demonstrate a greater willingness to experiment with legal norms,
on the assumption that their judgments comprise only the opening
98. See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Conn. 1996) (holding that
except for matters that the state constitution has "textually ... reserved to the
legislature,... it is the role and the duty of the judiciary to determine whether the
legislature has fulfilled its affirmative obligations within constitutional principles,"
and citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)); Comm. for Educ.
Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1203 (Il. 1996) (Freeman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137); DeRolph v. State, 677
N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ohio 1997) (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137)). But see City
of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995) (rejecting the idea that Marbury
supports judicial intervention in school finance).
99. See Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004). The
court put the issue before it this way:
1W]hether a local executive official who is charged with the ministerial duty
of enforcing a state statute exceeds his or her authority when, without any
court having determined that the statute is unconstitutional, the official
deliberately declines to enforce the statute because he or she determines or
is of the opinion that the statute is unconstitutional.
Id. at 462.
100. Id. at 490.
101. Kramer, supra note 1, at 229.
102. See supra notes 57-59, 68-73 and accompanying text.
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statement in a public dialogue with the other branches of government
and the people."'13 Hershkoff also quotes Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye
of the New York Court of Appeals as saying, in a similar vein, that
because "state courts are generally closer to the public,.., any
erroneous assessments they may make [are] more readily redressable
by the People."'" Amendment, experimentation, judicial elections,
and relatively small scale all make state constitutionalism inherently
more popular than federal constitutionalism. 05
More interesting in light of Kramer's argument are cases where the
citizens of a state have opposed judicial supremacy through vigorous,
grass-roots assertions of popular power rather than merely by availing
themselves of judicial election and amendment. In the peroration to
The People Themselves, Kramer offers a list of strategies for resisting
judicial supremacy that he views as fully legitimate, but that are
abhorred by the legal, judicial, and academic establishments: "The
Constitution leaves room for countless political responses to an overly
assertive Court: Justices can be impeached, the Court's budget can be
slashed, the President can ignore its mandates, Congress can strip it of
jurisdiction or shrink its size or pack it with new members," and so
on.1°6 Strikingly, several of these tactics have been deployed in the
states quite recently. Jurisdiction-stripping has appeared in the
struggle over gay marriage, as Georgia voters in the November 2004
election amended their constitution to block any ability of state judges
to preside over the dissolution of gay marriages performed
elsewhere.0 7 The school finance cases (once again) offer several
examples of nonjudicial elected officials who, with an eye on the
ballot box, choose simply to evade judicial mandates.108 In state after
state, education-finance plaintiffs have had to return to court
repeatedly to enforce their early victories in the face of legislative and
executive stonewalling; 9 meanwhile legislators and governors willing
103. Hershkoff, supra note 43, at 1163.
104. Id. at 1168. Hershkoff also notes the literature on negative electoral
consequences for judges who take positions unpopular with the voters. See id. at 1159-
60 nn.161-62.
105. Fixed judicial terms and ease of amendment, precisely the features of state
constitutionalism that Sager suggests complicate justice-seeking state constitutional
partnerships, see supra notes 57-59, 70-71 and accompanying text, are identified by
Kramer as desirable techniques for balancing political accountability and judicial
independence, see Kramer, supra note 1, at 250.
106. Kramer, supra note 1, at 249-50.
107. Ga. Const. proposed amend. 1, 1.b (passed by initiative Nov. 2, 2004 ) ("The
courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction to grant a divorce or separate
maintenance with respect to any such relationship or otherwise to consider or rule on
any of the parties' respective rights arising as a result of or in connection with such
relationship.").
108. See Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey's
Experience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 615, 615-16
(2004).
109. See, e.g., id. at 615.
2005] 1459
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to acquiesce to the judicial understanding of their constitutional duty
have in some states been replaced by the electorate1 ° or at least
targeted by well-financed opponents.1"'
Nor has popular resistance been expressed only through pressure
upon elected officials. In Vermont, resistance to a school-finance
equity decision included efforts to encourage widespread statewide
civil disobedience to property tax collection.'12 Several towns
withheld their taxes from the state education fund for a time, two
capitulating only after the courts froze their town bank accounts."3 A
more creative tax-avoidance strategy was subsequently embraced by
Killington, Vermont, where a 2004 town meeting passed a resolution
seeking secession from Vermont and union with New Hampshire' 1
4
that, in the view of one observer, "reads like a throwback to the 1700s,
when the restive American colonies chafed under the rule of the
British monarchy." '115 Notwithstanding the town's noncontiguity with
the Granite State, Killington continues to pursue its quixotic quest
and has spurred interest in secession in several other wealthy
Vermont communities.1
1 6
Vermont is particularly striking because its popular
constitutionalism has incorporated direct action. Wealthy local
foundations protested the court's school finance decision by
boycotting sectors of Vermont's economy1 17 and made direct
donations to wealthy districts in order to circumvent the wealth-
sharing requirements the legislature passed in response to the court's
110. See Thomas Corcoran & Nathan Scovronick, More Than Equal: New Jersey's
Quality Education Act, in Strategies for School Equity: Creating Productive Schools
in a Just Society 53, 63-65 (Marilyn J. Gittell ed., 1998) (documenting dramatic
political backlash against efforts to equalize school funding in New Jersey's
legislative, gubernatorial, and senatorial elections in the early 1990s).
111. Michael A. Rebell & Jeffrey Metzler, Rapid Response, Radical Reform: The
Story of School Finance Litigation in Vermont, 31 J.L. & Educ. 167, 183 (2002).
112. See id.
113. See id.; Erin E. Buzuvis, Note, "A" for Effort: Evaluating Recent State
Education Reform in Response to Judicial Demands for Equity and Adequacy, 86
Cornell L. Rev. 644, 679 n.259 (2001).
114. Cf Abner Greene, Can We Be Legal Positivists Without Being Constitutional
Positivists?, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1401, 1413 (2005) (arguing that uncertainty over the
demands of political justice should lead sovereign states to provide for robust exit
rights, including "emigration, if a viable option").
115. Tim McCahill, Town Has a Different State of Mind, Miami Herald, Mar. 2,
2004, at Al; see also Erica Jacobson, N.H., Killington, to Talk About Town's
Secession, Burlington Free Press, July 10, 2004, at B1.
116. See Sarah B. Miller, Some Vermonters Want to 'Live Free or Die,' Christian
Sci. Monitor, Aug. 23, 2004, at 3.
117. See Act60.org, Another Lesson in Reality for Montpelier, at
http://www.act60.org/found.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2004) (stating that the Freeman
Foundation of Stowe, Vermont is withdrawing tens of millions of dollars in annual
support for Vermont land conservation except "in towns that are members of the
Vermont Coalition of Municipalities," a group opposed to the finance-equalization
legislation).
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mandate." 8  Kramer offers early in his book a fairly sympathetic
account of the colonial practice of "mobbing," "an accepted, if not
exactly admired, form of political action" in which groups "not of
criminals or gangs or drunks and other riff-raff, but of what
contemporaries referred to as the 'middling sorts'- shopkeepers,
artisans, farmers, and laborers" expressed their political views through
"[m]ob action [that] followed implicit, customary rules about how
much violence was appropriate and which targets were permissible.""' 9
Despite this warm description, Kramer is apparently not prepared to
include mobbing in the above-noted list of tactics available to those
interested in the popular displacement of today's judicial autocrats; 2 '
but following the passage of Act 60, which implemented the Vermont
Supreme Court's school finance decision, a "station wagon once
owned by one of Act 60's chief sponsors was brought to the state
capitol and destroyed by passers-by, who were urged to vent their
anger using sledge-hammers".'21 The anti-court rhetoric is pure
Kramer too. A New York Times reporter on the story interviewed an
auto mechanic who "sa[id] quietly: 'They're going to start a
revolution. I think we should have another Boston Tea Party"' and a
realtor, perhaps with mobbing on his mind, who called Act 60 "'[t]he
great rape .... I think there will be blood in the streets.'
1 22
It is in the states, then, that we find the closest thing to evidence
that we have about what a contemporary The People Themselves-style
popular constitutionalism might look like. That evidence suggests
that Kramer's version of the constitutional partnership would not lead
to a community of equal citizens reasoning about their constitution
together. Nor would it lead to a descent into constitutional anarchy-
court-ordered school finance reform in Vermont, as in other states, so
far has survived its detractors. Nevertheless, these examples of real
life popular constitutionalism make vivid the essential disagreement
between Sager's and Kramer's understanding of the constitutional
partnership. In the school finance cases, state high courts like
Vermont's behaved just as Sager says justice-seeking courts should.
118. See Rebell & Metzler, supra note 111, at 183 n.106.
119. Kramer, supra note 1, at 27.
120. See id. at 249-50.
121. Rebell & Metzler, supra note 111, at 183. Kramer reports that mobs were
"often led by local gentry." Kramer, supra note 1, at 27. Playing a modified version of
that role in Vermont is novelist John Irving, a wealthy immigrant to the state, who
gained widespread national attention for deriding the Vermont court's approach to
school finance as "Marxism" and considerable statewide opprobrium for saying that
he would not speak about the issue to local press lest he make his child "a target of
trailer-park envy." See, e.g., Peter Kurth, Civil War: A Prayer for Owen Mean,
Toronto Globe & Mail, July 4, 1998, at D2. (There is no evidence or suggestion
anywhere that Irving had anything to do with the station wagon, sledgehammers, or
predictions of bloodshed.)
122. Elinor Burkett, Don't Tread on My Tax Rate, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1998,
(Magazine), at 42, 43.
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In light of an abstractly-worded state constitutional mandate to
educate children, and given a prior legislative decision to put public
schools in place, they have imposed upon those schools constitutional
requirements of adequacy and fairness in order to secure to all a
minimum level of material well-being. In response, politicians who
move to redistribute educational funds more fairly are targeted and
sometimes defeated at the polls, the wealthy refuse to pay their taxes,
and anti-equity foundations organize in Vermont to make charitable
donations to rich schools in order to evade the obligation to share
excess tax revenue with the poor. How should we regard those
Vermonters who, with writer John Irving, complain that the Vermont
court has expressed nothing more than the state's "high degree of
knee-jerk presumptions against the rich"?'23 In them, Kramer,
although perhaps demurring to the distastefulness of their politics,
would still discern a faction of democrats battling for "popular rule"
against the judiciary's elitist "forces of aristocracy."' 24  But Sager
would see injustice in plainclothes.
123. Kurth, supra note 121, at D2.
124. Kramer, supra note 1, at 247.
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